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THE WTO: BITING THE HAND THAT FED IT
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that two countries (A & B) are involved in a trade
dispute. The dispute arose because country B refused to accept
shoes that country A's shoemakers produced. B's reason for refusal
is that A's producers use a chemical to enhance the soles of the
shoes, thereby allowing the wearer to run faster. Controversy has
arisen, however, regarding the chemical's safety. B's scientists
believe that this chemical causes detrimental side effects, such as
flat-footedness. A's scientists, on the other hand, do not believe that
there is any causal connection between the chemically enhanced
shoe and its country's instances of flat-footedness.
Based on B's scientists' concerns, B refuses to accept any shoes
A produces with this chemical, despite the shoes' apparent supe-
riority. A, therefore, brings a nullification and impairment action1
in the World Trade Organization (WTO) against B for B's refusal to
accept A's shoes, and, after completely exhausting the WTO dispute
resolution process without convincing B to accept its shoes,2 A,
acting completely within WTO rules, retaliates against B. A does
this by raising tariffs on several different goods it imports from B,
goods which A's domestic consumers previously purchased because
of their physical and price superiority.
This hypothetical is loosely based on the Beef Hormone dispute
between the United States and the European Union (EU).3 As in
this hypothetical, the parties in the Beef Hormone dispute incurred
the economic consequences of retaliatory tariffs because they could
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XXIII 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. Article XXIII sets out the general
framework for a dispute settlement proceeding. Within this framework exists a cause of
action for the breach of a complaining member's obligation by another party. See id. art.
XXIII(1).
2. See discussion infra Part II.C.
3. See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
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not reach a satisfactory agreement 4 pursuant to existing WTO
dispute resolution process procedures.5
Although the measures introduced in the WTO are a vast
improvement on previous dispute procedures,6 from a Ricardian
economic perspective this outcome is entirely inefficient.' WTO
rules that allow a country to raise tariffs in order to "strike back"
at uncooperative countries not only cause diplomatic strife but also
prevent countries from attaining the benefits of international trade.
Instead of using this draconian approach to dispute settlement,8
this Note proposes that the WTO use pecuniary damages to resolve
trade disputes. 9 This would go much further in attaining the
underlying objectives and benefits of international trade. This Note
will begin with a historical description of free trade to illustrate
why it remains an important subject. Following this overview, Part
II will describe the current WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure,
with particular focus on its inherent inefficiencies. Finally, in Part
III, this Note will attempt to encourage debate on the efficacy
and efficiency of the current system by proposing changes which
4. The two countries could not reach a settlement on an amount of compensation the
losing party should pay in order to restore the overall balance of trade that existed prior to
the conflict. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
[hereinafter WTO Agreement), Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute
Understanding].
5. See Dispute Understanding, supra note 4, art. XXII, para. 2. Retaliation is the last
resort for a country involved in a trade dispute over a violation of WTO law. The disputing
countries must exhaust a number of mechanisms before they may legally use retaliation. For
further explanation, see discussion infra Part II.D.
6. Prior to the Uruguay Round, the General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade (GATT)
had no appeal procedures and no mechanism existed for authorizing retaliation short of
obtaining the affir-mative votes of all GATT members, including the losing party. Pierre
Pescatore, Drafting and Analyzing Decisions on Dispute Settlement, in PIERRE PESCATORE
ET AL., 1 HANDBOOK OF WTO/GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT pt. 2, at 14 (June 1997). This
effectively gave each losing party the ability to veto completely "fair" settlements. See G.
Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World
Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 840 (1995) (explaining the history of GATT dispute
resolution system prior to creation of the WTO).
7. This is true because the WTO has intentionally rid itself of the gains that it acquired
through comparative advantage and trade. See infra note 13 (discussing comparative
advantage).
8. Some accurately analogize this to "shooting yourself in the foot." FRANK W. SWACKER
ET AL., WORLD TRADE WrrHOUT BARRIERS § 4-3(c)(3), at 310 (1995).
9. Dispute Understanding, supra note 4, art. XXII, para. 2.
2320
20031 THE WTO: BITING THE HAND THAT FED IT 2321
illustrate that current trade enforcement is completely out of line
with the underlying goals of free trade.
I. THE CASE FOR FREE TRADE
Adam Smith, in his seminal book, The Wealth ofNations, was one
of the first to analyze the economic importance of international
trade.'0 Smith argued that the key to national wealth and power is
economic growth. A country's growth, in turn, is primarily a func-
tion of the division of labor."
When Smith spoke of international trade, he did so in terms of
absolute advantage. 2 It was David Ricardo, however, who built
upon Smith's theories and established the concept upon which
the WTO was founded: comparative advantage. 3 He noted that
although any one country may have an absolute advantage in the
production of many goods,' 4 every country is likely to have a
10. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(Kathryn Sutherland ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (1776).
11. As Smith so famously opined: "The greatest improvement in the productive powers
of labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is any
where directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labour." Id. at 1.
12. Absolute advantage, in light of production, means that any one country can produce
a good more efficiently than others. This follows from the assumption that each country has
a limited amount of raw inputs with which it can make certain products. Because each
country is limited in its productive capabilities, the country that has a particular amount of
inputs necessary for the production of a certain good will be able to produce that good more
efficiently than other countries--i.e., it has an "absolute advantage." For an excellent
graphical and numerical example of this theory, see HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE
MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 522-24 fig.29.8-29.9 (3d ed. 1993).
13. The law of comparative advantage reasons that because each country has only a
limited amount of resources, each country has the ability to produce one good at a relative
advantage to another. This notion builds on Adam Smith's theory of absolute advantage:
though one country could hypothetically have the ability to produce all goods more efficiently
than smaller countries, it still has limited resources. Therefore, the larger country should
apply its resources to the goods which it can produce most efficiently and allow for other
countries to produce the goods for which they have a relative advantage. If each country can
produce one good cheaper, relative to how another country can produce it, each will have an
advantage in the production of one commodity and a disadvantage in the production of
others. Each country will then be anxious to export the commodity in which it has an
advantage and import the commodities in which it has a disadvantage. If this is done,
international trade can increase the total wealth of society. J.R. MCCULLOCH, THE WORKS
OF DAVID RICARDO 72-86 (Lawbook Exchange 2000) (1846).
14. See supra note 12.
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comparative advantage in the production of at least some goods.15
All countries theoretically have something to contribute, and,
through the process of multilateral exchange, benefit from trade. It
is "[through] exploiting [this] comparative advantage [that] liberal
trade policies permit the unrestricted flow of the best goods
and services at the lowest prices, thereby increasing total world
wealth.""6
One can easily trace the importance of international trade
throughout world history. 7 An excellent example of the benefits
realizable through trade is the initial growth 8 and development of
the high performance Asian economies (HPAEs).' 9
Academics have viewed the HPAEs as an illustration of how
modernization and increased economic well-being are encouraged
by free exportation of goods.20 The HPAEs have achieved very high
growth rates at an average of eight to nine percent since the mid-
1960s. Such growth is incredible when compared with the two to
three percent growth the United States and Western Europe
realized during this same period.2'
15. See supra note 13.
16. RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW § 1(b) (1998); see also PAUL A.
SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUs, ECONOMICS 691 (16th ed. 1998) ("When countries
concentrate on their areas of comparative advantage under free trade, each country is better
off."). For a good graphical illustration of the benefits of international trade brings to world
markets, see id. at 697 fig.35-7.
17. For a good illustration of the importance countries place on the free trade principle,
one need look no further than the beginnings of American history. The Founders realized
that many problems occurred when the Articles of Confederation gave the states virtual carte
blanche to impose customs duties and trade barriers. See generally CHARLES A. BEARD, AN
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 52-63 (1913)
(discussing how economic factors led to the adoption of the Constitution).
18. "Initial growth" because of the economic problems these countries now face. This,
however, appears to be more of the consequence of poor banking and fiscal management than
a failure of trade growth. See, e.g., The Non-Performing Country, ECONOMIST, Feb. 16,2002,
at 24-26 (discussing Japan's now long-standing recession).
19. See generally PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS:
THEORY AND POLICY 265-70 (4th ed. 1997) (discussing different explanations for the HPAEs'
success, including theories crediting free trade and theories crediting government
intervention). The HPAEs are Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore,
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and China. Id. at 267.
20. For a useful survey of the growth of the HPAE's, see generally WORLD BANK, THE
EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROwTH AND PUBLIC POLICY (1993).
21. KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 19, at 266.
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The HPAEs all have one identical feature: They are open to
international trade.22 Following from this and other examples of
trade-induced growth, experts have noted that in today's world,
international trade, dependent on growing adherence to free trade
principles, should be even more of a priority than it has been in the
past.2 ' Both the GATT and the WTO are based on the underlying
benefits of liberal trade policies.2 Accordingly, it is from this
perspective that this Note addresses international trade disputes.'
22. There has been significant dispute, however, over how "open" these markets truly
are. On this debate, see generally id. at 265-70.
23. This argument is even stronger when one recognizes the trend toward lower
information costs and increased transportation capacity that we see in today's world. See
Louis De Alessi, Form, Substance, and Welfare Comparisons in the Analysis of Institutions,
146 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 5, 14 (1990).
24. Martin Wolf writes:
In a liberal economic system, government does not thwart private parties in
their attempt to enter voluntary transactions, and taxes are stable, predictable,
and nonprohibitive. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is
liberal in this sense....
Interventions in liberal exchange [by governments] across frontiers to
make trade fair may be the political price of liberalism, but such interventions
are themselves its antithesis.
Martin Wolf, Why Trade Liberalization is a Good Idea, in THE URUGUAY ROUND, A
HANDBOOK FOR THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 14 (J. Michael Finger & Andrzej
Olechowski eds., 1987).
25. Free trade principles have, however, encountered much less than universal embrace.
Opponents point out that free trade proponents argue from an idealized model that does not
reflect the problems of reality. Some of these problems include the destructive nature of
competition and unemployment. See generally 2 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON
MONEY 374-87 (1930). Other potential dangers include the the threat to Member countries'
sovereignty. See Results of the Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the S.
Comm. on Finance, 103d Cong. 240 (1994) (statement of Ralph Nader); Shell, supra note 6,
at 896 n.319 (noting that free trade "sometimes involve[s] a loss of domestic control over
economic and social priorities"). A good illustration of this concern over loss of control is the
EUs rationale for refusing to comply with the WTO rulings on the beef hormone disputes.
The EU argued that compliance would prevent Member nations from exercising the
"fundamental right of governments to choose the level of health protection they consider
necessary for their citizens." Neil Buckley, EU Defends Ban on Hormone-Treated Beef, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 1997, at 3. For an argument to the contrary, see JOHN H. JACKSON, THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT & THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS
181 (2000) (describing how the WTO "Appellate Body is [taking] a more deferential attitude
- towards national government decisions (or in other words more deference to national
'sovereignty')"). An example of this deference is seen in Report of the Appellate Body, United
States--Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29,
1996), available at 1996 WL 227476 ("WTO members have a large measure of autonomy to
determine their own policies on the environment (including its relationship with trade), their
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
II. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WTO
Enforcement procedures are a necessity within any legal
framework. They provide the way in which societies encourage
compliance with existing rules, thereby giving certainty to those
operating within it.2" The goal of enforcement should be to im-
plement efficient administration devices because rules based on
efficiency considerations will lead to the correct incentive and risk
allocations for those operating within the system.27 From an
economic perspective, upon which the Members constructed the
WTO,28 the WTO dispute resolution process falls far short of this
objective.
A. WTO's Beginnings
To fully explain this failure to achieve efficiency, it is necessary
to give both a brief introduction to the history of the GATT's
original dispute resolution process and a description of its trans-
formation, following the Uruguay Round, into the present process.
GATT did not authorize retaliation by an injured country unless
a party obtained the consent of all GATT contracting parties.29 This
unanimity rule shockingly required the affirmative vote of the
country that had lost its case. 30 The not too surprising result was
that retaliation presented no more than an idle threat. GATT's
environmental objectives and the environmental legislation they enact and implement.").
26. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 101-03 (5th ed. 1998)
(discussing how opportunism is one of the dangers inherent in the process of voluntary
exchange, and thus society must rely on enforcement procedures); see also Azar M. Khansari,
Searching for the Perfect Solution: International Dispute Resolution and the New World
Trade Organization, 20 HASTINGS INT'L& COmP. L. REv. 183, 189 (1996) (describing GATT's
(pre-WTO) dispute resolution process as one of a lack of confidence and uncertainty
ultimately leading to the search for a more "rule-oriented regime").
27. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAw & ECONOMICs 129-134 (1989)
(arguing that efficiency should be "the sole criterion used to evaluate legal rules").
28. Wolf, supra note 24, at 19-20 (discussing economic efficiency objective of WTO).
29. The term "contracting parties" describes membership to the original GATT
agreement. Following the Uruguay Round, and creation of the WTO, these same contracting
parties are now called Members.
30. Pierre Pescatore, Drafting and Analyzing Decisions on Dispute Settlement, in
PESCATORE ETAL., supra note 6, pt. 2, at 14 (1997).
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inability to deter improper behavior, despite a functioning legal
framework, led to huge losses in efficiency.
To illustrate, in the years between 1948 and 1990, many disputes
never lasted long enough to warrant retaliation. More than seventy-
seven percent of the rulings found that the complaint was justified,
but the disputes were either partially or completely settled through
means other than retaliation."1 At first glance, this would appear to
demonstrate that the system was working efficiently despite the
disquieting veto power GATT gave to each contracting party. The
failure of countries who violated GATT rules to follow GATT
rulings, however, is more illustrative of the problems inherent in a
system without a sufficient deterrence mechanism. For example, in
a dispute between the United States and Nicaragua, GATT declared
a United States discriminatory sugar quota illegal.32 Despite this
ruling, the United States refused to alter its trade stance until
Nicaragua met United States political demands. Even though the
United States eventually removed the discriminatory sugar quotas,
the case was a clear-cut illustration of legalistic inefficiency.
The failure of GATT's ruling to compel the United States to
remove its sugar quotas led to substantial losses. These injuries
included not only the lost sugar sales for Nicaragua,33 but also the
disputing parties' wasted expenditures in arriving at an alternative
outcome. 4 These "inefficiencies" became apparent to countries op-
erating within the GATT framework and pushed some nations to
revert to self-help procedures.35
31. ROBERT E. HUDEc, ENFORcING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 273-355 (1993) (providing
a statistical profile of GATT dispute settlement cases).
32. United States-Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua, Mar. 13,1984, GATT B.I.S.D. (31st
Supp.) at 67, 74 (1985).
33. Sales which would have netted a surplus to United States consumers and Nicaraguan
producers.
34. There were, however, alternative benefits that the United States derived from its
failure to comply with GATT's ruling. The United States was able to achieve its desired
result of inducing democratic elections. This political and philosophical achievement's benefit
could, in the eyes of some, outweigh any economic losses that resulted from the United
States' failure to comply; this behavior, however, remains economically unjustified.
35. For the United States, this "self-help" need led to the development of Section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (1974) (codified as amended
at 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (2000)). Various business interests lobbied Congress for stronger
enforcement procedures, resulting in Congress authorizing "unilateral" trade sanctions in
Section 301. Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralism: An Overview, in AGGREssrvE
2003] 2325
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B. From GATT to WTO
As the GATT contracting parties became aware of GATT's
enforcement shortcomings, compliance with its rulings began to
suffer."6 During the first twenty years of GA Ts existence,
contracting parties implemented its rulings about eighty percent
of the time. In the following years, however, party compliance fell
to less than sixty percent.37 The contracting parties recognized
that there were serious problems with GATT mechanisms and
attempted to remedy them in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations. The Uruguay Round of negotiations began in
1986 and continued through 1994. These negotiations resulted in
the creation of the WTO.
3 8
The WTO was not, however, a replacement of previous GATT
substantive law; instead, the WTO agreement consisted of
"institutional" changes.3 9 Though the WTO changed little of GATT
substantive law, it created a vast amount of new law.4' This was
accomplished through a series of detailed annexes.
The Dispute Understanding was included in one of these
annexes.4' The Dispute Understanding made several important
changes to GATT dispute rules and procedures.42 One of the most
important new rules for the purposes of this Note is that disputing
UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 1-2 (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990). Section 301 endowed the President with the power
to unilaterally retaliate against foreign protectionist devices through various means,
including trade sanctions. BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 16, § 10-2.
36. See Khansari, supra note 26, at 189.
37. Kendall W. Stiles, The New WTO Regime: The Victory of Pragmatism, 4 J. INT'L L.
& PRAC. 3, 9 (1995).
38. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND TExT 218-19 (4th ed. 2002).
39. Id. at 219 (describing the WTO agreement as a "mini charter").
40. Id. at 220. This included new agreements and understandings covering agriculture,
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, textiles and clothing, technical barriers to trade,
trade-related investment measures, dumping and countervailing duties, rules oforigin, pre-
shipment inspection, import licensing procedures, safeguards, intellectual property, trade
policy review mechanisms, optional agreements, and dispute settlement rules.
41. Dispute Understanding, supra note 4.
42. Id.
[Vol. 44:23192326
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parties must adopt a WTO panel report43 unless a party notifies the
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) that it plans to appeal or unless the
DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report." This drastically
modifies GATT's earlier practice of giving any losing country the
ability to veto an unfavorable panel holding.45 A second important
change is that the Dispute Understanding now provides for appeals
from DSB decisions.46 Third, the Dispute Understanding prohibits
unilateral action by its Members intended to redress what they see
as violations of obligations, requiring instead that winning parties
use WTO settlement procedures.' 7 Finally, the WTO presents an
injured country with strengthened means with which to enforce
trade sanctions for noncompliance-specifically, the power to
retaliate.' Although these changes are a dramatic improvement
from the impoverished GATT dispute resolution process, 9 the
underlying goals of economic efficiency remain unrealized.
C. Steps Of Dispute Resolution Pursuant to the Dispute
Understanding
In order to fully discuss the failings of the current WTO dispute
resolution process, it is necessary to briefly explain its basic pro-
cedures. The objective of the dispute resolution process is to help
disputing countries reach a mutually agreeable settlement or, if
43. A WTO panel report is the decision of the trial level judges of the Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB). An Appellate Body report is the decision of appellate level judges of the DSB and
is fimal absent consensus by the DSB to overturn the decision.
44. Dispute Understanding, supra note 4, art. XVI; see also Shell, supra note 6, at 848-
53.
45. See Shell, supra note 6, at 848-53.
46. Dispute Understanding, supra note 4, art. XVI; see also Shell, supra note 6, at 849.
47. Dispute Understanding, supra note 4, art. XVII; see also JOHNCROOME, GUIDETOTHE
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 20 (1999) ("Members ... may not determine that violations,
nullifications or impairment have taken place, except in accordance with approved panel or
appellate findings, and must follow other rules in the Understanding that give a reasonable
time for panel recommendations to be followed and govern resort to retaliation.") (footnote
omitted).
48. See Dispute Understanding, supra note 4, art. XXII; see also CROOME, supra note 47,
at 23-24 (discussing retaliation under the WTO).
49. The WTO also produced positive externalities missing from its predecessor's regime.
The improved system (1) reduces transaction costs for its Members; (2) provides Members
with valuable information; and (3) makes the overall operation of the regime more
predictable. ROBERT O. KEOHANE, ArrER HEGEMONY 89-95 (1984).
23272003]
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that is not possible, to remove the measures inconsistent with the
WTO agreement.50 Articles III and IV simply allow a complaining
Member to call for removal of the alleged offending measure51 and
provide the respondent ten days with which to reply to the
complaint.52 The countries then must enter into consultation within
thirty days. 53
If consultations are unsuccessful, the aggrieved Member can
request that the DSB set a panel. 54 The complainant and respon-
dent submit the facts and their arguments to the panel and the
panel submits a report to the parties.55 If the panel finds the
challenged measure to be inconsistent with WTO rules, it recom-
mends a remedy in a panel report. After the panel presents its
report, the DSB adopts the report within sixty days unless a party
appeals the decision. 6 If the defendant appeals, there are further
proceedings within sixty days, or, at maximum, within ninety days.
The Appellate Body then issues a report that the DSB adopts,
absent consensus not to adopt it, within thirty days.57
Once the Appellate Body issues its report and the DSB adopts it,
the losing party must state whether it intends to implement the
recommendations.58 If immediate compliance is not possible, DSB
procedures allow a party a "reasonable period of time" to act in
accordance with the report.59 If the defendant Member does not
comply within this time period, the complaining Member may
request negotiations to determine mutually acceptable compen-
sation. 0 If after twenty days the parties cannot agree on satis-
factory compensation, the complainant may request authorization
50. CROOME, supra note 47, at 23.
51. Dispute Understanding, supra note 4, art. III, para. 7.
52. Id. art. IV, para. 3.
53. Id.
54. Id. art. VI.
55. Id. arts. XXII-XIV (prescribing the rules and procedures for panel review).
56. Id. art. XVI, para. 4 (both parties may appeal the report for legal error).
57. Id. art. XVII, para. 14.
58. Id. art. XXI.
59. Id. art. XXI, para. 3. A reasonable period of time is a flexible concept. First, the party
implementing the decision will propose a period for implementation. If the DSB accepts this
as reasonable, that is the end of the matter. If the DSB disagrees, the next step is for the
parties to the dispute to agree on a reasonable period. If this is unsuccessful, binding
arbitration will set the appropriate period for implementation. Id. art. XXI, para. 3(a)-(c).
60. Id. art. XXII, para. 6.
2328 [Vol. 44:2319
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from the DSB to retaliate.6' This generally will involve the com-
plainant's suspension of concessions or obligations it previously
granted the other party.62
D. Retaliation in Action
Member countries generally reach mutually agreeable outcomes
without ever resorting to removing concessions or other retaliatory
measures. This does not mean, however, that when a country
imposes retaliatory tariffs, small losses are the result. The effect on
the economies of both parties can be enormous: A tariff on any
industry has the initial effect of raising the targeted product's price
to domestic consumers, thereby causing rational consumers to
substitute less desirable alternatives. The losses do not derive
from the producer's lost sale alone, but also from the consumer
who likely valued the imported product more than the alternative
(otherwise, he would not have initially been predisposed to pur-
chase that imported good)-instead, he now receives an inferior
product. This result cumulates throughout the economy, resulting
in huge losses.6 ' When disputing parties reach the final stage of the
dispute resolution process, compliance with WTO rules is rarely the
outcome. Rather, the parties take on avoidable inefficiencies.
The problems inherent in the WTO's retaliation scheme are the
economic effects which inevitably accompany trade barriers. As this
Note previously observed, free trade is very beneficial to trading
nations.64 At the most basic level, tariffs have three costly effects on
the free flow of trade: (1) domestic producers, operating under a
tariff-induced price umbrella, can expand production; (2) consumers
are faced with higher prices and therefore reduce their consumption
61. Id. art. XXII (compensation and suspension of concessions).
62. This is the reinstatement of tariffs or other nontariff barriers eliminated by previous
trade regulations. Id art. 24.
63. There is an argument that the gain to domestic producers counters this loss, but this
is an inefficient gain. It provides a disincentive to the domestic producer to more efficiently
produce his product, either through innovations or cost reductions. He no longer has to
compete with companies abroad that produce superior products-instead, the tariffs force
customers to purchase his more costly product.
64. See supra Part I.
2003] 2329
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of the imported good, resulting in the loss of an unrecoverable
surplus; and (3) the retaliating government gains tariff revenues. 5
Even though academics recognize these losses, many still feel
that Ricardian efficiencies are never attainable." The primary
argument is that although a world of free trade would be ideal, this
world is not an ideal place. The reasoning is, "[a]s long as other
countries impose import restrictions or otherwise discriminate
against our products, we have no choice but to play the protection
game in self-defense. Well go along with free trade only as long as
it is fair trade. But we insist on a level playing field." 1
Though this perspective appears both sensible and equitable, it
is not founded in either good economic analysis or an understanding
of world history.68 Consider the extreme examples that Professors
Samuelson and Nordhaus provide of how this logic might play
out: "If [a discriminating country] decided to slow down trade by
putting mines in its harbors, should we mine ours?" 9 Although this
example is intentionally outrageous, consider their next example:
"[f China violated trade agreements by pirating American CDs,
how would the United States gain by putting 100 percent tariffs on
Chinese silks and other textiles?"70 With these examples, the
professors are demonstrating the potentially self-destructive nature
of retaliatory tariffs. By reciprocating for injurious trade policies, a
country will likely cross the line between convincing other nations
65. SAMUELSON & NoRDHAus, supra note 16, at 700. It may appear to some that a tariff
may actually generate extra profits for domestic producers and government revenues that
outweigh consumer losses; however, economists have historically disfavored them."[T]he
economic loss to consumers exceeds the revenue gained by the government plus the extra
profits earned by producers." Id. Economists refer to these shortfalls as deadweight social
losses. JACKSON ErAL.,supra note 38, at 41-43 (giving graphical explanations demonstrating
the "deadweight loss" effects of tariffs and quotas on consumer surplus).
66. "Ricardian efficiencies" occur when nations capture surpluses from international
trade because of comparative advantage. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text
(discussing the writings of David Ricardo, for whom the efficiencies are named).
67. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 16, at 704 (discussing this perspective).
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
2330 [Vol. 44:2319
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to reduce their trade violations71 from harming their own
consumers and escalating international disputes.
Another problem with retaliation is that even when the offending
nation responds to retaliation by removing concessions, this has
been accomplished by a drawn-out battle of diplomacy.72 This
"shortcoming[] reflect[s] the fundamentally political nature of the
implementation process-in contrast to the earlier stages of the
dispute resolution process under the [Dispute Understanding],
which are at least somewhat more insulated from political
pressures.""3
Political "foot-dragging" is inherent in the current WTO
retaliatory scheme. Examples include:
Mobilization of other Members to support a losing defendant;
sowing the seeds of opposition to full implementation in one or
more of the winning complainant Members (such as the EC has
attempted to do by arguing that by pressing for full
implementation [in the Bananas dispute], the United States
would be responsible for the death of the Caribbean banana
industry and attendant economic, political and social con-
sequences); and seeking to divide and conquer winning
complainant countries.74
Additional political problems may include smaller countries
refraining from using available remedies for fear of an adverse
reaction from a larger-and therefore economically significant-
trading partner. This appears to have been exactly the reason
71. The Reagan Administration reported:
Intervention in international trade ... even though costly to the U.S. economy
in the short run, may, however, be justified if it serves the strategic purpose of
increasing the cost of interventionist policies by foreign governments. Thus,
there is a potential role for carefully targeted measures ... aimed at convincing
other countries to reduce their trade distortions.
Id. (quoting the 1982 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT).
72. One can categorize such delays as transaction costs. For an example of these costs
in action, see Frances Williams, EU'Needs 8 Months'to End Banana Crisis, FIN. TIMES, Apr.
20, 1999, at 9 (discussing the delays and inefficiencies that occur while countries wait to
implement retaliatory measures because of diplomatic concerns).
73. Timothy M. Reif & Marjorie Florestal, Revenge of the Push.Me, Pull-You: The
Implementation Process Under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, 32 INT'L LAW.
755, 756 (1998).
74. Id. at 781.
20031 2331
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Mexico "soft-pedaled" their Tuna-Dolphin dispute with the United
States.75 With NAFTA negotiations proceeding during litigation,
Mexico had strong incentive to avoid antagonizing one of its most
important trading partners and therefore decided not to pursue the
case though some "intermediary" countries pressed them to do so.76
Repeated successful attempts of powerful countries in preventing
both immediate and effective implementation of DSB, rulings such
as the Tuna-Dolphin and Banana7 disputes, will inevitably lead to
a loss of confidence in the ability of the dispute resolution process
to provide consistent and reliable outcomes.
A related problem with the current system is the WTO's inability
to attain the compliance of superpower nations.78 Glaring examples
of this problem are the Beef Hormone and Banana disputes. The
Banana dispute involved a conflict between the EU, the United
States, and several Central American countries. 9 EU Members had
been granting their ex-colonies preferential access to their banana
markets in Europe.80 The United States and the Central American
countries complained that these preferential import regimes
violated WTO rules.8 ' The United States and the Central American
countries successfully challenged the EU's practices before the
WTO. 2
75. JOHN WHALLEY & COLLEEN HAMILTON, THE TRADING SYSTEM AFrER THE URUGUAY
ROUND 130 (1996).
76. See WTO BEYOND THE AGREEMENTS: THE TUNA-DOLPHIN DISPUTE, at
http://www.wto.org/thewto e/whatis-e/tif-e/bey5 e.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2003).
77. See infra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
78. These are WTO Members such as the United States and the European Union, whose
relative size and corresponding economic power allow them to control trade relations with
smaller countries.
79. See James M. Cooper, Spirits in the Material World: A Post-Modern Approach to
United States Trade Policy, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 957, 970-71 (1999).
80. Id. at 970.
81. Id. at 970-71.
82. Report of the Panel, European Communities--Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by Ecuador, WT/DS27/R/ECU (May 22, 1997), available
at 1997 WL 490487; Report of the Panel, European Communities-Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by Guatemala and Honduras,
WT/DS27/R/GTM,WT/DS27/R/HND (May 22, 1997), available at 1997 WL 409148; Report of
the Panel, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, Complaint by Mexico, WT/DS27/R/MEX (May 22, 1997), available at 1997
WL 533133; Report of the Panel, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by the United States, WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22,
1997), available at 1997 WL 461900.
2332 [Vol. 44:2319
20031 THE WTO: BITING THE HAND THAT FED IT 2333
The EU, undeterred by the DSB's panel report, then instituted an
appeal and followed up with numerous delay tactics.83 It took
almost three years from the time the United States' instituted the
complaint to its resolution and the institution of WTO-approved
sanctions. 84
The Beef Hormone dispute presented similar difficulties. The
problems began when the EU objected to the United States' usage
of growth hormones in U.S. beef production. Faced with public
outcry over the effects of hormone beef when consumed by humans,
the EU instituted an import ban on hormone beef.85 The United
States filed a complaint against the EU in 1996.86 In 1997, the WTO
issued a panel report stating that the EU ban constituted an unfair
trade barrier.8 7 Despite this report and a subsequent Appellate
Body ruling,8 the EU continued to refuse to lift its ban on beef
imports.8 9 These two cases-the Banana and Beef Hormone
disputes-are just two examples of some difficulties that emerge
when parties attempt to enforce WTO rules on powerful countries.
83. These "delay tactics" included not implementing the WTO panel reports to the
satisfaction of the complaining countries. This led to repetitive litigation and arbitration to
attain compliance. See Williams, supra note 72.
84. Report of the Appellate Body, European Communites-Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997) [hereinafter Report of the
Appellate Body, Bananas], available at 1997 WL 577784. It must be noted, however, that the
approval of United States retaliation still did not lead to an effective resolution of the banana
controversy. The EU, in an attempt to avoid the retaliatory tariffs, continued to find ways
to avoid meaningful compliance with the DSB rulings. It was not until 2001 that the EU and
the United States finally resolved the Banana Dispute. See Press Release, Office of the
United States Trade Representative, U.S. Government and European Commission Reach
Agreement to Resolve Long-Standing Banana Dispute (Apr. 11, 2001), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2001/O4/01-23.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2003).
85. See Report of the Appellate Body, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones) WT/DS26/AB/R, paras. 2-5 (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Report of the Appellate
Body, Hormones], available at 1998 WL 25520 (holding that the scientific evidence did not
support the EU's ban on U.S. beef).
86. Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities-Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products, GfTBT/D/5 (Jan. 3,1996), available at http://docsonline.
wto.org/gen-search.asp.
87. Report of the Appellate Body, Hormones, supra note 85, para. 6.
88. Id.
89. For a discussion of the conflicting interpretations of the Appellate Body Report by
both the EU and the United States, which led to further delays in dispute resolution, see
Benjamin L. Brimeyer, Note, Bananas, Beef, and Compliance in the World Trade
Organization: The Inability of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process to Achieve Compliance
from Superpower Nations, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 133, 156-61 (2001).
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Another practical reality belying the argument for retaliation is
that in many instances the withdrawal of concessions is either a
virtual impossibility or an idle threat. This is the dilemma for many
export-dependent countries, and it is magnified by the "already
extensive tariff reductions made during successive GATT rounds of
multilateral tariff negotiations.
"90
The problems of export-dependent countries may appear, at first
glance, to actually support the use of retaliatory tariffs from an
economic point of view. It could be argued that retaliation, at least
with export-dependent countries, is not a substantial economic
concern.91 This statement, however, undervalues the original intent
behind the retaliation scheme-to deter nations from infringing on
free trade. Deterrence is conspicuously absent when a country lacks
any real power to stop another country's noncompliant behavior.
The combination of these two factors, export dependence and the
nonexistence of tariffs,92 often leaves a country with very little with
which it can retaliate.93 With all of the problems, why should we use
procedures that contradict the very principles underlying our world
trade system, especially if the end result of compensating injured
countries can be attained through more efficient procedures?94
III. PROPOSAL
Although many of the procedures in place today are a significant
improvement upon past GATT practices,95 even more efficiency
is possible through a relatively straightforward change: simply re-
moving the modus operandi of retaliating countries and eliminating
Member countries' ability to reciprocate injuries by removing
concessions. Instead, the WTO should modify the first step under
90. JACKSON, supra note 25, at 83.
91. This is because the smaller countries cannot exacerbate the economic losses through
the imposition of tariffs. The small amount of imports they receive prevents any substantial
economic loss to the small country's consumers or the exporting country's producers.
92. An export-dependent country may have few tariffs because it does not import many
goods and thus has little with which to threaten another country.
93. Jackson, supra note 25, at 83
94. See generally Wolf, supra note 24 (discussing the underlying liberal economic
principles of world trade).
95. See supra Part I.B (discussing changes to GATT implemented through the WTO).
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the Dispute Understanding"6 and make compensation not just a
goal, but compulsory.
A. Efficacy and Problems with a New System
As a threshold matter, this Note recognizes that the primary
policy underlying the dispute resolution process is deterrence, not
compensation." Current procedures, however, do not advance this
to a further extent than would a process purged of deadweight-
producing measures. The goal, therefore, should be for the WTO to
continue to maintain a strong system of enforcement that leaves
economic inefficiencies behind.
Proceeding with this objective in mind, the first question is
whether countries comply with the current WTO dispute pro-
cedures. Unless there is regular fulfillment of WTO obligations, the
change that this Note proposes will have little effect and simply be
a waste of administrative resources. In other words, there would be
no point in changing the rules of a system that no one follows.
Professor Jackson, however, has concluded that nations generally
do adhere to the dispute resolution process.98
A pattern of decreased "removal of concession retaliations"
(RCRs) has recently emerged.99 This is in line with the original
intent of the Dispute Understanding, which makes clear that
suspension of concessions is meant to be only "temporary"'00 be-
cause of its disastrous effects.
Given general compliance, an elimination of RCRs could further
effectuate the Dispute Understanding's objective. The practical
96. The first step in a dispute is to negotiate "with a view to developing mutually
acceptable compensation." Dispute Understanding, supra note 4, art. XXII, para. 2.
97. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
98. JACKSON, supra note 25, at 179, 189 (indicating the "general spirit of compliance"
with which Member countries, even the largest of them, act in the face of negative reports).
There are, however, differing opinions as to what level of compliance there has actually been.
This is not surprising when one considers that DSB demands are subject to numerous
interpretations. The implementation of DSB's report in the Banana dispute suffered from
this problem. See Brimeyer, supra note 89, at 161-64 (discussing the EU and United States'
conflicting interpretations of the Appellate Body report and consequent delays in reaching
a final solution).
99. See WHALLEY & HAMILTON, supra note 75, at 133 (noting that the number of
instances where a dispute has reached retaliation is "surprisingly small").
100. Dispute Understanding, supra note 4, art. XXII, para. 8.
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effect of perpetual RCRs, remaining in place for as long as the
offending country has failed to come into compliance and as long as
diplomatic measures are unsuccessful,' °' so far has had little effect
in persuading countries determined to follow independent goals and
policies. Supporters of the current regime cannot, therefore, justify
RCRs on superior deterrence grounds.' 2
B. Gains from a System Without Retaliatory Tariffs
The benefits of a system free of retaliatory tariffs are obvious.
Tariffs are inefficiency-producing mechanisms that result in
deadweight losses to society overall. 103 In the hypothetical proposed
at the beginning ofthis Note, country B refused to accept country
A's shoes, and as a result A retaliated. Country A would impose a
retaliatory tariff, if practical, against the same sector that B's
noncompliance injured. This would raise prices for the targeted
goods, as well as their complementary goods,'0 4 and affect both
domestic buyers and foreign sellers. Domestic buyers would reduce
the quantity they demanded of the affected imports, and foreign
sellers would suffer losses. The result would be a reduction in the
welfare of domestic consumers, a reduction in the welfare of foreign
producers, and an introduction of deadweight losses.' 5
Eliminating RCRs that cause deadweight loss could have a major
impact on the welfare of countries that reach the final stage of the
dispute resolution process. Returning to the hypothetical of
countries A and B, if the DSB did not condone A's retaliation in the
form of tariffs, but instead awarded pecuniary damages to offset
their industry losses, A would recover the revenue from the lost
sales and provide B incentive to bring its conduct into compliance
with WTO rules. Moreover, society would not experience the
unnecessary residual harm that RCRs produce.
101. SWACKER ET AL., supra note 8, § 4-3(b)(3).
102. See infra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
104. Complementary goods are "[gloods that 'go together'; a decrease in the price of one
results in an increase in demand for the other, and vice versa." KARL E. CASE & RAY C. FAIR,
PINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 52 (6th ed. 2002).
105. N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 184 (1998). Professor Mankiw also
notes that any gains domestic producers make, along with the gains of their factory
employees, are outweighed by the losses for the nation as a whole. Id. at 178.
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C. Improvements on the Current Retaliatory Scheme
1. Diplomacy
Political concerns have historically been inseparable from
international law.' This intermingling of politics with the
implementation of DSB reports has led to many problems in the
current system. The WTO framework is the international trading
community's latest attempt to deal with some of these problems;
accordingly, it is inherently legalistic in nature.0 7 The character of
such a code theoretically should encourage a complete withdrawal
from "Power Oriented" diplomacy.' Sadly, this has not been the
real world effect of the WTO. As the Tuna-Dolphin dispute
demonstrates,1 9 these "power" movements still exist. Political "foot-
dragging""0 causes even more delays in implementing what could
be efficient solutions. Because of the institutional intermingling of
both politics and international dealings, the current system does
not present any viable solution. This Note's proposed changes
would not completely resolve this recurring problem because it is
unlikely that the international field will ever exist as a completely
egalitarian system. The changes, however, would be a vast improve-
ment on the current system.
106. ASIF H. QURESHI, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL
TRADE NORMs 50 (1996).
107. Id. at 10 (noting that "[tlhe substantive law of the WTO partakes more of the nature
of a code than of a detailed regulatory system") (footnote omitted).
108. JOHN H. JACKSON, PERSPECTIVES ON THE JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE:
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF LEGAL PROCEDURES IN THE UNITED STATES 1570-71 (1984). Jackson
categorizes diplomatic techniques into two groups: power-oriented and rule-oriented. Power-
oriented diplomacy consists of a diplomat asserting the clout of the nation that they
represent to gain an advantage in negotiations. Alternatively, rule-oriented diplomacy
revolves around pre-defined rules that all players must follow, regardless of their relative
size and strength. Commentators have also described this technique as a legalistic approach
to diplomacy. Id.
109. See supra Part II.D (discussing the problems inherent in WTO retaliation
policy/schemes).
110. Id.
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2. Inability to Attain the Compliance of Superpower Nations
The DSB's inability to deter the world's most powerful
countries' inappropriate trade behavior is another visible blemish
on the WTO's generally favorable performance. The statements of
Ambassador Mickey Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative, clearly
illustrate this failure: "No ruling by any dispute panel, under this
new dispute settlement mechanism ... can force us to change any
Federal, State, or local law or regulation. Not the city council of Los
Angeles, nor the Senate of the United States, can be bound by these
dispute settlement rulings
Would this Note's proposed approach remedy the problem of
noncompliance of superpower nations? The answer is unclear, but
at the very least, the suggested change would be a substantial
improvement to existing mechanisms.
The most obvious benefit is the recurring theme of this Note-the
reduction in deadweight losses to the world as a whole."' The fact
that the current system is unable to ensure compliance belies any
argument that such a change would worsen the existing deficiencies
in the DSB's deterrence function. Are there, however, other
potential detriments which would accompany such a change?
A strong argument against removing retaliation as an option is
that we should not displace mechanisms designed to give relatively
small or developing countries the ability to ensure proper behavior
with more powerful trading partners. As Professor Jackson has
noted, the participation of developing countries in the current
dispute settlement system has increased and led to generally
positive results."
This optimistic pattern, however, does not appear to be the result
of the threat of retaliatory tariffs; instead, countries' threat of any
challenge,'14 and the superpower countries' voluntary compliance
with Appellate Body reports are what enable developing or smaller
111. GATT Implementing Legislation: Hearings on S.2467 Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 103d Cong. 33, 37 (1994) (statement of Ambassador Mickey
Kantor). This common response to the threat of losing control over one's own domestic affairs
likely prevents any international legal system's attainment of complete control.
112. See supra Part III.B (discussing gains in a system without retaliatory tariffs).
113. JACKSON, supra note 25, at 180.
114. See, e.g., US Threatens Canada with WTO Case, Hints at Mexico Challenge, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Apr. 3, 1998, at 1.
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countries to enforce proper trade relationships. 5 If a larger country
such as the United States or the EU decides to disregard an
Appellate Body report, imposing retaliatory tariffs will not ensure
a change in behavior. Retaliation simply imposes unnecessary costs
on the global economy.
If we instead used a system that simply imposed pecuniary
damages, smaller countries would have the same protection. The
injuring country would be faced with the prospect of paying for the
harm it caused, which in and of itself would be an improved
deterrent factor.
The next question is whether WTO imposed damages would
remove what little incentive countries currently have to change
noncompliant behavior. In the current system, retaliation continues
until the offending Member withdraws its violative measures. This
promotes compliance because the loss of export revenues continues
to grow until the offending country makes the necessary changes.
This Note's proposed changes could follow either the current
framework by imposing recurring damages, or institute one-time
penalties.
A new WTO policy of one-time damages would more closely
follow the intent of Article XXII of the Dispute Understanding
(Compensation and the Suspension of Concessions), which requires
that "[tihe suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be
temporary .... 11 Recurring penalties, however, as opposed to one-
time penalties, would constitute more of a deterrent. Countries
would be less willing to continue noncompliant behavior if the
prospect of losses continued to accumulate. Under the current
retaliatory scheme such a result is far from evident. In both the
Beef Hormone and Banana disputes, the offending country refused
to comply with Appellate Body rulings,'17 despite the eventual
imposition of retaliatory tariffs."' The complaining Member's
115. See Report of the Appellate Body, United States Restrictions on Imports of Cotton
and Man-Made Fibre Underwear WT/DS24/AB/R, (Feb. 10, 1997), available at 1997 WL
426484.
116. Dispute Understanding, supra note 4, art. XXII, para. 8 (emphasis added).
117. See Report of the Appellate Body, Hormones, supra note 85; Report of the Appellate
Body, Bananas, supra note 84.
118. Some argued that the European Community (EC) tried, albeit half-heartedly, to
comply with WTO rulings in the Banana case. See generally Reif& Florestal, supra note 73,
at 776-82 (discussing the EU's opinion over what constituted compliance with the Appellate
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maintenance of RCRs merely led to the cumulation of economic
losses. Instituting recurring damages may not completely change
this pattern, but at the minimum would greatly reduce economic
costs.
The above paragraph illustrates that a system contemplating
one-time penalties would not be much of a deterrent. An additional
problem with changing to a single-sanction system is that its
success would be a practical impossibility. If the WTO allowed
nations to simply decide to pay an initial penalty and then
disregard WTO declarations on required compliance, the system's
validity would fall into disrepute. Cooperation and compliance
within the system would be replaced by a situation in which
wealthy nations could simply reach into their pockets to follow their
own agenda, regardless of the deleterious effect on the trade system
as a whole. A system that continues to impose penalties on a
noncompliant Member thus emerges as the most viable option.
The WTO could also avoid any serious loss in deterrence by
increasing estimates as to what damages are appropriate. It is
unlikely that a country will view damages designed to compensate
for injuries it imposed on an entire industrial sector (including
complementary industries) as insignificant. Moreover, the reader
must not forget that countries would have deterrents in addition to
WTO-imposed fiscal penalties. A particularly important disin-
centive is that a country choosing to ignore DSB reports would, as
under the current regime, gain an injurious reputation. Such a
standing in the international community impairs future negotiation
over trade, and can force the uncooperative country to answer for
these failures in other areas subject to negotiation. 11 9
Another improvement that would likely accrue if the WTO
were to employ pecuniary damages is that the remedy would be
universally available. This is important because, as discussed
above, under the current scheme, it is practically impossible for
some smaller export-dependent countries to deter noncomplaint
behavior with retaliatory mechanisms 2 If the WTO imposed
Body ruling).
119. William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in OATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51, 76-78
(1987).
120. See supra Part II.D (discussing problems inherent in WTO retaliation
policy/schemes).
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damages, however, a country's relative trade strength would have
much less impact on a larger trading partner's incentive to comply
with WTO standards.
Although the preceding sections of this Note have illustrated the
benefits of a system free of retaliatory tariffs, they have perhaps not
fully answered the question of whether such a change would do
anything to improve the compliance with unfavorable rulings of
superpowers such as the EU and United States. It is important to
note, however, that even the United States, which has been a sub-
ject of controversy on the system's ability to generate compliance,
has at least as much of an interest in maintaining an international
trading system as any other country. The United States and other
large trade-heavy countries are active participants in international
trade. They thus have everything to gain from a predictable and
dependable system that has the fewest unfavorable secondary
effects. 121
D. Objections to a New System
1. Administration and Information Costs
The prohibitive cost of imposing any rule that requires a large
degree of information to determine appropriate action is an
objection to any change in a system that involves parties as large as
entire nations. In many cases, ideal procedures can become so
expensive that they become practically impossible.
Fortunately, assessing appropriate damages for a breach of WTO
rules need not incur any additional costs-the WTO would follow
current procedures. Compensation should remain "equivalent to the
level of nullification or impairment. 122 This evaluation would
require knowledge of not only the offended sector, but also of the
damage the violations inflicted on the victim country's overall
economy.
121. SWACKER ET AL., supra note 8, § 4-3(c)(3), at 310-11 (discussing net benefits to the
United States of an effective dispute settlement program).
122. Dispute Understanding, supra note 4, art. XXII, para. 4.
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There is no question that these appraisals would be difficult and
very costly to obtain 2 3 in a system of limited resources, but it would
be no different than the current system. The current system already
limits retaliation by principles of proportionality. 124 The WTO
makes assessments of the limits of appropriate retaliation under
the system in place today. This Note's proposed amendment to the
current system would thus not impose costs more onerous than
those currently in place.
2. Sovereignty Concerns
Large countries would likely oppose the introduction of a system
that would grant an independent international body the power
to "punish" noncompliant Members with pecuniary damages.
They would see this independent authority as a threat to their
sovereignty. Does this mean that the WTO, as imagined by this
Note can never exist except in theory? The history of the world, and
continuing international consolidation points to a resounding: "No!"
One thing that can be said with certainty is that international
cohesion will continue to flourish. The WTO recently added China
123. An example of how the WTO acquires these measurements is found in the Decision
by Arbitrators, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WT/DS26/ARB (July 12, 1999), available at 1999 WL 512321. The decision discusses the
WTO's use of the American system of evaluating damages:
(1) it examined relevant actual US exports during a recent period in which the
EC was, in the US view, failing to comply with its WTO obligations; and (2) it
estimated the relevant exports that would have existed during the same period
if. (a) the EC were acting in compliance with its WTO obligations; (b) the long-
term economic adjustments resulting from compliance were reflected; and (c)
all other factors were held constant. The US refers to the estimate in (2) as "the
counterfactual." Harm to US exports is estimated as the difference between the
actual value of exports in (1) and the estimated value in the counterfactual (2).
Id. at *7. This process is further complicated when the complainant is a developing country.
The Dispute Understanding directs the DSB to "take into account not only the trade coverage
of measures complained of, but also their impact on the economy of developing country
Members concerned." Dispute Understanding, supra note 4, art. XXI, para. 8.
124. Proportionality imposes a "general limitation on the exercise by ... national
authorities of the powers conferred upon them by ... law by requiring the measures they
adopt to be in proportion to their ultimate objectives." ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 199 (1999). A good example of this current practice is the
Beef Hormone case. There, the retaliatory measures the WTO allowed the United States to
use were set at an amount equal to the amount ofharm the EU's refusal to accept American
meat products inflicted on American industry.
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to its membership, and in the not too distant future, will likely add
Russia to the WTO's enlistment of more than 130 Members. China's
entry integrates the world's most populous country into the
equation,'25 making any country's continued refusal to concede some
sovereignty to the WTO, in exchange for greatly expanded economic
opportunities, a very unwise move.
Consider, for example, the United States. A withdrawal from the
international scene would be extremely unwise as billions of dollars
in investment and trade-not to mention in foreign policy goals-
would be lost. Nevertheless, many Americans would still oppose a
push for increased international integration. The United States is
not even close to being free of protectionist thinking,126 and much of
the world shares American concerns. 27
In contrast to this pessimism, however, is the United Kingdom.
It provides a perfect example of a country that once was, and still
is, pervaded by isolationist feelings; it continues, however, to
acquiesce to increased supranational governance. This has occurred
even though the United Kingdom originally was opposed to the
idea of any supranational guidance. 2  The United Kingdom has
subsequently pushed aside such concerns in order to benefit
from a Europe with "economic conditions similar to those on the
market of a single state,"'29 and become a member of the European
125. Geoff Winestock & Karby Leggett, China to Enter WTQ; Dispute on Insurance To Be
First Test, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2001, at A14.
126. See Tariffs on Steel: George Bush, protectionist, ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 2002, at 13
(discussing the President's recently announced "plans to protect the American steel industry"
through "temporary high tariffs (ranging up to [thirty-percent])").
127. See Turkey and the EU: A general speaks his mind, ECONOMIST, Mar. 16,2002, at 53
(discussing Turkey's reluctance to accede to the EU's conditions on membership). Some of
Turkey's concerns include converting to a democratic government and the settlement of
territorial disputes. Id. These required concessions have prompted at least one leading
traditionalist to call for "alternatives" to EU membership. Id. (citing statements by Gen.
Turner Kiline, Secretary General of Turkey's National Security Council).
128. The "Schuman plan," a framework the French Foreign Minister designed to unite
Europe following World War II, met with enthusiastic approval from France, Germany, Italy,
and the Benelux countries. The United Kingdom, however, rejected the idea of subjugating
itself to a supranational institution. See A.M. ARNULL ET AL., EuROPEAN UNION LAW 3 (4th
ed. 2000).
129. Id. at 8. Three years after Britain initially rejected the "Schuman Plan," negotiations
for membership began anew. This resulted in Britain's eventual membership into the
European Economic Community. These successive efforts by the United Kingdom exhibit the
willingness of even traditionally isolated countries to give away sovereignty in order to reap
the rewards of a greatly enlarged trading union.
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Economic Community. This trend of increased integration has
continued, and may even lead to British abandonment of its
traditional pound in favor of the Euro. Britain's new found
attention to the Euro is especially telling of how Britain's
isolationist sentiments have given way to a powerful push for
greater international integration; it also serves as a prognosis of
future action by the United States. Though the British have long
been Europe's most reluctant citizens,8 0 their growing interest in
a uniform international currency has taken root and continues to
grow.13'
Like Britain, the EU as a whole serves as a perfect illustration of
how a trading union will continue to develop into a supranational
institution with the ability to affect all aspects of its member's
domestic concerns. The EU's founders envisioned it as a supra-
national institution that would lead to major advances in economic
growth." 2 Economic reform, however, is only one of the remarkable
changes that have developed through the EU.133 Social reform,
130. See id. at 3-12.
131. The British adoption of the Euro was very unlikely at one point. This reluctance was
first evident in 1997, when Gordon Brown, the United Kingdom's Chancellor of the
Exchequer, took the financial community by surprise and declared an independent monetary
policy. Instead of aligning itself with the European Central Bank, the chancellor announced
that the Bank of England would establish operational independence. See Let Pounds & Euros
Compete: Contrary to General Opinion, the Issue of Economic and Monetary Union has
become Less Important to Britain, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 17, 2002, at 17. The decision to isolate
Britain's economic governance from the rest of the EU was to many a sure sign of a British
refusal to tie its economy to the fate of the rest of the Union.
Recent polls by the "Yes" campaign, however, show that this sentiment has taken a
dramatic turn. See Kevin Brown & Robert Shrimsley, Top Business Support for Membership
of Euro Soars, FiN. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2002, at 3. The campaign promotes adoption of the Euro
in Britain.
Bob Worcester, chairman of MORI [a British research company], said the
results were highly encouraging for the government, which supports entry in
principle; subject to a referendum and five economic tests set by Gordon Brown,
the U.K. chancellor. "This is very good news for them because the steady
decline (in support) since 1998 has been reversed. Our figures for typical voters
in a referendum show that economists, bankers and business leaders are the
people they would be most influenced by."
Id.
132. Brown & Shrimsley, supra note 131, at 3.
133. The EU has recently admitted ten new countries to its membership and began
working on a European Constitution that will possibly bring even greater cohesion to its
members. See The European Union Summit: From the Sublime to the Cantankerous,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 22, 2001, at 57-58.
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including the reduction of discrimination against different races,
nationalities, and gender are but some of the far-reaching effects
EU trade regulation has encouraged. 114 These changes are not the
result of legislation aimed directly at social policies, as these issues
are not part of what is essentially a trading union.1"5 Instead, these
results are a part of the EU's intent to further trade and thus
eliminate any impediments to that goal. 3
6
These are just a few examples of the changing face of inter-
national relations and the power and draw of increasing economic
opportunities. Countries all over the world, including the United
States, will soon be unable to resist the temptation of an ever-
increasing market; they will be forced to concede on some issues of
domestic control. Viewing sovereignty issues through the lense of
the emerging marketplace is likely to transform current political
impossibilities into tomorrow's reality.
3. Refusal to Pay
Even with the consent of all WTO Members to switch to a
damages system, there exists the possibility that a superpower
country would not comply with a DSB decision. This could occur, for
example, if the United States decided that the damages panel
assessed against it were excessive. Although this is a possibility in
any legal system that requires a losing party to compensate through
pecuniary remedies, it would be unlikely that the United States or
any other superpower country would do so in the WTO.
First, the United States and the EU already belong to other
international trade organizations that provide damages as a remedy
134. See ARNULL, supra note 124, at 144-48.
135. Id.
136. This is evident when one considers a law that would prohibit impediments to the free
movement of goods, workers, services, payments, and capital-the four tenets of the EU.
Uwe Blaurock, Steps Toward a Uniform Corporate Law in the European Union, 31 CORNELL
INT'LL.J. 377,379 (1998). To illustrate, ifa country were to discriminate against women, and
thus prohibit them from working, it would impede the free movement" of women workers
from other countries. See Case C-197/96 Commission v. French Republic, 1997 E.C.R. 1-1489
(invalidating French legislation that prohibited night work by women in plants, factories,
and workshops).
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for aggrieved parties;"3 7 therefore, such a system would not be
unprecedented nor incomprehensible for either Member. Moreover,
assuming the United States or any other superpower country
committed itself to this proposed system, it is unlikely that they
would remove themselves from the most expansive international
trading system simply because of an unfavorable decision. The
more likely result is the status quo: Responding nations will not
eliminate trade barriers but will continually compensate the com-
plaining country for their noncompliant behavior.'38
4. Rapid Recovery
One welcome benefit to a system that utilizes damages would be
a shortened period between the complaining Member's injury and
its eventual compensation. Under current procedures, reparation
is made through market channels. Any compensation the in-
jured party receives is only by way of gains from essentially
"protectionist" measures."'
This system leaves a significant time lag between a country's
imposition of tariffs140 and its eventual compensation. If the system
were instead one of pecuniary damages, there would be nearly
instantaneous remuneration. Once the DSB made a decision to
137. See North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America, The Government of Canada and the Government of the United Mexican
States, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 1135(1), 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 (providing damages for
violations of investor's rights); Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991
E.C.R. 1-5357, paras. 31-33 (noting that it is inherent in the system of the EU Treaty that a
member state must be liable for loss and damages inflicted on individuals as a result of the
member state's breaches of Community law).
138. Obviously, the aggrieved Member would get the benefit of receiving pecuniary
damages (and all the additional economic benefits) rather than be left with a possibly
unattractive opportunity to retaliate. See supra Part III.B.
139. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 16, at 704 (noting that in "the United
States and other countries, firms and workers who are injured by foreign competition
attempt to get protection in the form of tariffs or quotas"). The injured industry then gets the
benefit of now facing more expensive imports; this logically pushes domestic consumers into
substituting away from those products. The injured sector, therefore, recovers damages
through indirect channels.
140. Not to mention the practical time difficulties that seemingly accompany many
attempts at attaining retaliation. See supra Part II.D.
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impose penalties, the payment would ideally go directly to those
injured by the offending measures. 141
5. Ambiguity
One problem under the current system is that it is unclear
whether a WTO Member that the dispute panel directs to become
consistent with treaty rules is obligated, as a matter of inter-
national law, to comply or whether that nation has the option
merely to compensate by other trade measures and not follow WTO
directions. The question, then, is whether this Note's proposed
changes would resolve this ambiguity. Unfortunately, the changes
in the retaliatory scheme would not likely do so. This does not
mean, however, that changes in the current scheme of retaliation
would be inconsequential. Efficient compensation remains an
attainable goal that the WTO should pursue to increase world-wide
gains from trade.
CONCLUSION
The political economy of trade policy encompasses many con-
cerns. The most prominent trade system, the WTO, makes economic
efficiency its primary objective, yet employs procedures inconsistent
with this goal." 2 Why should the WTO utilize procedures contrary
to its fundamental purpose? Looking at current procedures and
their consequences, any compelling rationale for their continual use
is lacking.
Although the system undoubtedly requires strong enforcement
mechanisms, retaliatory tariffs are destructive and inefficient.
They cause the unnecessary loss of global welfare and encourage
diplomatic strife. Returning again to the hypothetical dispute
involving countries A and B in the beginning of this Note, if we use
141. These benefits are based on the assumption that the proposed procedure would
require that any damages go directly to the harmed sectors, essentially following current
practice. See CROOME, supra note 47, at 24. The motive for this could be the same as that
underlying the practice of retaliation. Admittedly focused on deterrence, these measures
have the additional benefit of providing injured industries with the opportunity to regain lost
sales, albeit indirectly. If the damages were diverted to other sectors, perhaps even hugely
beneficial social programs, the opportunity for compensation would be lost.
142. Wolf, supra note 24, at 14-21.
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the damages alternative, A, the complaining country, would be able
to acquire its lost sales and the benefits flowing from them without
injuring its own citizens.
A simple modification, moving from retaliatory tariffs to
pecuniary damages, would avoid these costs and, as this Note
demonstrates, not impose significant additional burdens on the
world economy.
Curtis Miller*
* Special thanks to Professor Eric Kades and Ann Mason for their insightful comments
and critiques, which contributed greatly in the transformation of this Note from earlier
drafts.
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